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owner. The defendant did not get the consent of the complainant
as required by this statute. He did not receive the consent of the
commissioner of conservation, who under the 1940 act had the
sole authority to grant permission to conduct explorations on pub-
lic roads, and who under the 1942 statute cannot issue such a per-
mit without the consent of the abutting property owner. It would
appear that within the meaning of these statutes the defendant
might have been properly indicted for unauthorized exploration
of either public or private lands.
LAWRENCE E. DONOHOE
SALES-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-OUTSTANDING POSSIBLE CLAIM
IN FAVOR OF A THIRD PERSON-The First National Bank of Shreve-
port, as tutor of minor children, petitioned the district court for
permission to sell at private sale some land belonging to the
minors. To this petition were attached the verifying affidavit of
the tutor's acting trust officer and an affidavit executed by the
minors' undertutor concurring in the tutor's recommendations
and prayer and stating that he considered it to the evident
advantage of the minors that the property be thus sold. On this
showing judgment issued, pursuant to which the sale was made.
Plaintiff purchased from the vendee of this sale and entered into
a contract to sell with defendant, under which it was agreed that
defendant would receive merchantable and valid title. Defendant
refused to accept title and plaintiff sued for specific performance.
Held, since the undertutor had not been ruled into court to show
cause why the prayer of the tutor's petition should not have been
granted,, as required by the statute regulating the sale of minor's
property by private act,1 the title was burdened with a possible
claim in favor of the minors. The validity of this claim could
not be inquired into, as the minors were not parties to the suit;
therefore, the title was "suggestive of serious future litigation"
and defendant was not required to accept it. Schaub v. O'Quin,
38 So. (2d) 63 (La. 1948).
In the instant case the court did not hold that the proceed-
ings by which the minors' property was sold were in fact invalid.
The court held that it was not possible in this suit to inquire into
the validity of the proceedings, as the minors were not parties
to the action and would be unaffected by the judgment. It might
well be, as the court pointed out, that in a proper proceeding,
with the minors duly represented, the court would find that the
1. La. Act 209 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4844-4847].
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title was "good and valid." The basis of such a decision could be
a finding by the court that the affidavit of the undertutor, con-
curring in the recommendation of the tutors' petition, was suffi-
cient to dispense with the rule to show cause. Or the court might
find that the minors could not contest the proceedings on the
ground of unjust enrichment 2 or that the acts of the tutor had
been such as to constitute him a negotiorum gestor.3 However,
in this case even a finding that the title was good and valid would
not have affected the ultimate decision, as the agreement between
the parties provided that the title to the property be merchant-
able and valid.
Merchantable title was defined in Roberts v. Medlock4 : Justice
Mills, speaking for the court of appeal, said, "'merchantable title'
is one which can be readily sold or mortgaged in the ordinary
course of business, to a reasonable person familiar with the facts
and apprised of the question of law involved. It need not be free
from every technical defect, of all suspicion, or the possibility of
litigation. . . . The word 'merchantable' implies something less
than a perfect title and permits of defects which are not reason-
ably liable to result in assault." This definition recognizes the
generally accepted distinction between good or valid title and
merchantable title; the former being one which may in fact be
good, but may require litigation to sustain it; the latter, one
which is good on its face. The cases have not always made this
distinction clear, and much loose language has been used in the
decisions.5 In sustaining a prospective vendee's contention that
the title tendered was not merchantable, the court has held that
2. Which is based on the moral maxim of the law that no one should
enrich himself at the expense of another. Art. 1965, La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. Where one undertakes on his own account to manage the affairs of
another, equity obliges the owner, whose business has been well managed,
to comply with the engagements contracted by the manager in his name.
Art. 2299, La. Civil Code of 1870. Article 2300 indicates that a third person
may be bound regardless of whether or not the owner is incapacitated, if
the gestor has the requisite capacity. (This doctrine has found little appli-
cation in Louisiana, but is amply sfupported by French authority. Arts. 1371,
1375, French Civil Code; Colin et Capitan, Cours Elementaire de Droit Civil
Frangals (18 ed. 1935) 2, § 952; Planiol, Trait Elementaire de Droit Civil (11
ed. 1939) 2, § 2273; Planiol et Ripert, Traite Pratique de Dr oit Civil Frangais
(12 ed. 1931) 7, § 730.)
4. 148 So. 474, 476 (La. App. 1933).
5. See Praegner v. Kinnebrew & Ratcliff, 156 La. 132, 100 So. 247 (1924),
where the contract required title to be "good and merchantable" and the
court held it was not "good and valid"; Tessier v. Roussel, 41 La. Ann. 474, 6
So. 542, 824 (1889), where on appeal it was held that the title was not "good




the title "must be legal from every point of view,"6 and that it
must not be "reasonably suggestive of litigation"'7 and that what
the vendee purchased was "the property-not the property plus
a probable law suit." The test most consistently applied by the
court has been whether the title is suggestive of serious future
litigation.9 However, the court has repeatedly held that one re-
fusing to accept title must show some substantial threatening
danger, not a mere remote possibility.10
While it is practically impossible to categorize all the cases,
due to the myriad factual situations presented, a glance at a few
of the more commonly occurring ones will serve to illustrate the
factors considered by the court in determining whether or not
the title is sufficiently free of question to be merchantable.
Where the legal defect raised is a slight discrepancy in the
description or designation used in a previous act of sale of the
property involved," the proposed vendee will be required to
accept title. The same result is reached where it is claimed that
title is subject to attack by forced heirs because it has been the
subject of a donation, and it is not shown that there are "in esse
or posse" forced heirs in whose favor such right of revocation
exists or is likely to arise.1 2 On the other hand the proposed ven-
dee will not be compelled to comply with the agreement to pur-
chase where property has been sold by one of the marital part-
ners, allegedly as his or her separate property, if it was purchased
by such party during the existence of the community. It is so
held even if the act of purchase, joined in by the other spouse,
contains a recital that the property is being purchased with sepa-
rate funds.13 The vendee can also avoid specific performance if
the property was acquired in a judicial separation of property
6. Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. White, 121 La. 715, 46 So. 782 (1908).
7. Marsh v. Lorimer, 164 La. 175, 113 So. 808 (1927).
8. Neuhauser v. Barthe, 110 La. 825, 34 So. 793 (1903).
9. Bachino v. Coste, 35 La. Ann. 570 (1883); James v. Mayer, 41 La. Ann.
1100, 7 So. 618 (1890); Lyman v. Stroudback, 47 La. Ann. 71, 16 So. 662 (1895);
Neuhauser v. Barthe, 110 La. 825, 34 So. 793 (1903); Praegner v. Kinnebrew
& Ratcliff, 156 La. 132, 100 So. 247 (1924).
10. In re Louisiana Savings Bank and Safe-Deposit Co., 48 La. Ann.
1428, 20 So. 909 (1896); Woolverton v. Stevenson, 52 La. Ann. 1147, 27 So. 674
(1900); Grasser v. Blank, 110 La. 493, 34 So. 648 (1903); Norton v. Enos,
158 La. 423, 104 So. 194 (1925).
11. Lassus v. Gourgott, 169 La. 577, 125 So. 623 (1929); Roberts v. Medlock,
148 So. 474 (La. App. 1933).
12. In re Louisiana Savings Bank and Safe-Deposit Co., 48 La. Ann. 1428,




in a divorce action, and the legality of the divorce obtained is not
settled.14
Though there are no cases so holding where merchantable
title was specifically required, it is well settled that the vendee
will be required to accept title if the vendor can show a prescrip-
tive title.'5 The court has indicated, in dicta, however, that even
where merchantable title was required a prescriptive title would
be sufficient.16
The court declined in the instant case (as the minors were
not parties to the cause) to go into the question of whether or
not substantial compliance with the statute regulating the sale
of minors' property by private act was sufficient to render the
title merchantable. This raises the question of when, if ever, the
court will inquire into the merits of an outstanding claim in favor
of a party not before the court. Although in a suit for specific
performance, the court cannot pass directly on the question of
title between plaintiffs and third persons who are not parties to
the suit, as the decision would not be binding upon the latter, 7
it can consider such questions so far as they affect merchant-
ability of title.18
With regard to the outstanding claims of minors who are not
before the court, the leading cases of Spence and Goistein v.
Clay'9 and Abraham v. Loeb 20 would seem decisive. From an
analysis of these two cases, the following may be concluded: if
on the face of the record it appears that the proceedings were
regular, third parties will be protected by the judgment; but if
the record does not reflect such regularity of proceedings, third
parties will not be protected by the judgment and therefore will
13. Bachino v. Coste, 35 La. Ann. 570 (1883); Gogreve v. Dehon, 41 La.
Ann. 244, 6 So. 31 (1899); Bartels v. Souchon, 48 La. Ann. 783, 19 So. 941
(1896). The court holding in these cases that where the property is pur-
chased during the marriage there is a presumption of law in favor of the
community, which can be rebutted only by extraneous proof, that the decla-
ration of origin of the price in the act of purchase does not make the prop-
erty paraphernal, and binds neither the creditors nor forced heirs; the latter
only to the extent of the disposable portion.
14, Carter v. Morris Building and Land Improvement Ass'n, 108 La. 143,
32 So. 473 (1902); Bonfield v. Trichenor, 189 So. 635 (La. App. 1939).
15. Pattison v. Maloney, 38 La. Ann. 885 (1886); Johnson v. Carrere, 45
La. Ann. 847, 13 So. 195 (1893); Meibaum v. Brennan, 49 La. Ann. 580, 21
So. 853 (1897); Westerfield v. Cohen, 130 La. 533, 58 So. 175 (1912); Metairie
Park Inc. v. Currie, 168 La. 588, 122 So. 859 (1929).
16. Lassus v. Gourgott, 169 La. 577, 125 So. 623 (1929).
17. Praegner v. Kinnebrew & Ratcliff, 156 La. 132, 100 So. 247 (1924);
Broussard v. Succession of Broussard, 164 La. 913, 114 So. 834 (1927).
18. Roberts v. Medlock, 148 So. 474 (La. App. 1933).
19. 169 La. 1030, 126 So. 516 (1930).
20. 35 La. Ann. 377 (1883).
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not be required to accept title. This conclusion would seem sup-
ported by the case under discussion, as here it was apparent from
the record that the proceedings were not regular, and the court
declined to consider whether or not the judgment was proper
(from the standpoint of whether the judgment actually worked
to the best interests of the minors).
Most instances in which the court has considered the merits
of the claim of a third party, when such party was not before the
court, have been those in which the court found that the claim
was without sufficient validity to render the title suggestive of
serious future litigation. These have most often been cases in
which, on the legal issue raised by the prospective vendee, it
could be determined (1) that the vendor or his authors in title
had a prescriptive title which the court felt could not be success-
fully attacked;21 (2) that the court had jurisdiction over the pro-
ceedings, which were regular, even though the judgment may
not have been the proper one;2 2 or (3) that the status of the law
on the issue raised was well settled.2 3 However, it appears equally
probable that the court will not inquire into the merits of the
claims of third parties not before the court if, on the legal issue
raised by the proposed vendee, it appears (1) that the law on
the question is not well settled2 4 or (2) that the proceedings
which were required by law were not regular.25
If the suit under discussion had been one by the vendee
against the vendor to rescind the sale for breach of the warranty
against eviction,26 would the decision have been different? The
21. The absence of cases on the point indicates that this will not apply
where the contract between the parties specifically requires that the title be
merchantable.
22. Spence and Golstein v. Clay, 169 La. 1030, 126 So. 516 (1930).
23. Bachino v. Coste, 35 La. Ann. 570 (1883); Norton v. Enos, 158 La.
423, 104 So. 194 (1925); Roberts v. Medlock, 148 So. 474 (1933). In these cases
the court found the law on the point clear to the effect that (1) failure to
attach certificates of non-alienation or of encumbrances to an act of sale
was not fatal to the sale (Norton v. Enos); (2) that an heir could dispose
of his interest in a succession by general description (Roberts v. Medlock);
and (3) that property purchased during marriage is presumed to be com-
munity property, until proved otherwise by evidence de hors the recital of
a deed (Bachino v. Coste).
24. Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. White, 121 La. 715, 46 So. 782 (1908), where
the question was then being litigated in another suit pending before the
court. The instant case appears to support this theory, as indicated by the
court's statement: "The conclusion is inescapable [that the title was sug-
gestive of serious future litigation] . . . when it is realized that there exists
no jurisprudence previously determining the question of whether or not a
substantial compliance with those statutory provisions will suffice."
25. Abraham v. Loeb, 35 La. Ann. 377 (1883).
26. Arts. 2500-2501, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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early jurisprudence as exemplified by Bonnable v. First Munici-
pality27 was to the effect that a vendor warranted his vendee only
peaceable possession of the property sold. The present rule,
interpreting Civil Code Articles 2500-2501, that an eviction is not
a prerequisite to an action in warranty by the vendee against his
vendor as long as there exists a perfect outstanding title in a third
person, was established in Bonvillain v. Bodenheimer28 (which
overruled the Bonnable case). It has since been held that when
the vendee fails to prove an outstanding title in a third person
he cannot successfully sue to resolve.2 9 Since under the facts of
the instant case the minors probably did not have a perfect title,
it is doubtful that the vendee would have been sustained in his
action. It is interesting to note that in order to determine
whether there was perfect outstanding title in the minors the
court would probably have had to decide whether substantial
compliance with Act 209 of 193230 was sufficient.
The agreement between the parties herein provided that the
title must be merchantable. A title is not merchantable if it is
suggestive of serious future litigation. As the minors were shown
to have a claim with a substantial basis for future litigation, the
decision is in accord with the prior jurisprudence. However, it
is submitted that the court was not justified in refusing to deter-
mine whether or not substantial compliance with Act 209 of 1932
was sufficient. The fact that there was no jurisprudence pre-
viously determining the question should not deter the courts of
a civil law jurisdiction. Had the court decided this question in
the affirmative, a more equitable result might have been reached.
J. DOUGLAS NEsoM
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVAcY-An innocent citizen had been
charged with and acquitted of the supposed murder of the plain-
tiffs' father, though the body had not been discovered. Twenty-
five years later, the father's body, together with a will, was,
returned from another state. It was thus revealed that he had
not been murdered but had been residing in another state since
his disappearance. Years after his actual death, defendant's radio
station produced this story concerning the plaintiffs' father, and
the plaintiffs sued for invasion of their right of privacy. Held, the
passage of time could not give privacy to the acts of their father
27. 3 La. Ann. 699 (1848).
28. 117 La. 793, 42 So. 273 (1906); Comment (1940) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 122.
29. Kuhn v. Breard, 151 La. 546, 92 So. 52 (1922).
30. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4844-4847.
[VOL. IX
